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Abstract 
In this paper we present a comprehensive set of 
mechanisms that restore to the site administrator the 
capacity of enforcing Traffic Engineering (TE) policies in 
a multiaddressed IPv6 scenario. The mechanisms rely on 
the ability of SHIM6 to securely perform locator changes 
in a transparent fashion to transport and application 
layers. Once an outgoing path has been selected for a 
communication by proper routing configuration in the 
site, the source prefix of SHIM6 data packets is rewritten 
by the site routers to avoid packet discarding due to 
ingress filtering. The SHIM6 locator preferences 
exchanged in the context establishment phase are 
modified by the site routers to influence in the path used 
for receiving traffic. Scalable deployment is ensured by 
the stateless nature of these mechanisms. 
1. Introduction1
The growing concern on communications reliability 
has resulted in a continuous increase of the number of 
sites that become multihomed, i.e. sites connected to the 
Internet through multiple providers. This configuration 
enables an improvement in the fault tolerance, along with 
the possibility of defining and implementing Traffic 
Engineering (hereafter TE) policies. In particular, fault 
tolerance and TE are a must for multimedia applications, 
which impose tight requirements on reliability and 
performance.  
However, the deployment scope of multihoming in 
IPv4 networks is limited to somehow large sites, since 
multihoming depends on the injection in the BGP routing 
system of the prefix of the multihomed site, and massive 
prefix injection would lead to the collapse of the 
interdomain routing system. IPv6, apart from providing a 
much larger address space to enable a stable end-to-end 
addressing model, it allows the deployment of 
                                               
1 This work has been partially supported by the OPTINET6 project TIC-
2003-09042-C03-01 and by the IMPROVISA project TSI2005-07384-
C03-02
multihomed sites without stressing the global routing 
system. In particular, the large address availability allows 
small multihomed sites to obtain Provider Aggregatable 
prefixes from their providers’ address blocks. Since the 
higher level providers only announce their own prefix 
block into the global routing system, a multihomed host is 
reachable at a given address only through its 
corresponding higher level provider. Consequently, in 
order to be reachable through all the available providers, a 
host within a multihomed end-site needs to configure as 
many addresses as prefixes are available in the 
multihomed site, becoming a multiaddressed host.  
A multiaddressed host has to include some new 
mechanisms to properly manage its multiple addresses 
when establishing new communications. Some basic 
support is required for preventing the discard of packets 
due to the ingress filtering performed by the providers [1], 
since a packet with a source address that does not 
correspond to the provider to which it has been forwarded 
will be dropped [2]. Another problem for the 
multiaddressed hosts is the preservation of an established 
communication when an outage affects the provider 
through which the communication is flowing. To solve 
this, it is required a mechanism to allow diverting the 
communication to the address of an alternative provider 
transparently to the transport and application layers. 
Transparency to upper layers is required because current 
transport layers identify the endpoints of a 
communication through the IP addresses of the nodes 
involved. A multihoming protocol located in a SHIM6 
layer within the IP layer is proposed by the IETF [3] to 
perform a locator change when an outage occurs, in a 
secure and transparent fashion with respect to transport 
and application layers. 
While fault tolerance support has received much 
attention, some challenges are raised in the management 
of TE capabilities. First, it should be noted that, in the 
multiaddressing model, the local address currently being 
used for a communication determines the provider 
through which the multiaddressed host is accessed. Some 
tools have been proposed to allow the end-host to 
influence the outgoing and incoming data path [4]: On 
one hand, DNS record manipulation allows expressing 
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preferences for the addresses selected by an external host 
that initiates a communication with the multiaddressed 
host. On the other hand, the Address Selection procedure 
[5] standardized for IPv6 hosts can be configured by 
means of the DAS Policy Table to express preferences for 
the selection of the source address in a communication 
initiated by the multiaddressed host.  
However, a relevant concern related with TE is the 
lack of tools to allow a multihomed site which does not 
own its addresses, either an end-site or a provider, to 
influence in the traffic that it receives or sends to its 
providers. In figure 1 we can see a provider ISP_X that 
obtains addresses and connectivity to the Internet through 
ISP_A and ISP_B, with C1 and C2 being client networks. 
These client networks may also have any other providers 
apart from ISP_X, as it occurs to C2. The provider ISP_X 
would require the deployment of some policies for the 
traffic being exchanged with the rest of the Internet, such 
as preferring a particular provider to obtain better 
performance, lower costs, etc.; or balancing traffic among 
both providers. The mechanism presented so far for TE in 
multiaddressing contexts [4] requires the configuration of 
the specific policies that satisfy the requirements of all the 
providers at each end-host: the administrators of the hosts 
at C2 should take into account the preferences at site C2, 
and combine then with the preferences of ISP_X, ISP_Y, 
along with all the higher level providers that do not inject 
their prefix into the interdomain routing system. This 
mechanism results in a very complex configuration, and 
besides, it is not compatible with dynamic changes in the 
policies of the sites. Additionally, some pieces of the 
network can depend on different administrators, requiring 
a difficult coordination to obtain the required behavior 

















Figure 1. Address assignment in a IPv6 
multiaddressed environment  
In this paper we propose a comprehensive set of tools 
to enforce TE policies for SHIM6 data packets without 
detailed configuration in the end-hosts. Additionally, 
these tools allow the administrators of end-sites and 
providers to enforce TE policies in a multiaddressed 
scenario. Prefix rewriting for source addresses plus proper 
internal routing configuration allow path selection for 
egress data packets, while preference rewriting for 
SHIM6 context establishment packets influences in path 
selection for ingress data packets. 
In the next sections we discuss current BGP TE 
capabilities, since the aim is to provide similar features to 
the ones available in the incumbent solution. We also 
describe the SHIM6 protocol and its security framework. 
Next, the mechanisms proposed so far for enforcing TE in 
a multiaddressed environment are presented. We detail 
the proposed mechanisms for TE with SHIM6, and show 
an application scenario in which BGP information is 
available. Finally we end the paper with the conclusions. 
2. Traffic Engineering in IPv4 multihomed 
sites 
The most widely deployed multihoming solution for 
IPv4 networks is based on the announcement of the site 
prefix through all its providers. In this configuration, the 
site S obtains a prefix allocation directly from the 
Regional Internet Registry. Then, the site announces this 
prefix to its providers using BGP [6]. The providers of the 
multihomed site announce the prefix to their own 
providers and so on. This mechanism provides fault 
tolerance capabilities, which include preserving 
established connections throughout an outage.  
The following TE tools are available to the 
multihomed site: 
• TE mechanisms for outgoing traffic: Multihomed sites 
use BGP attributes to specify preferences for the 
outgoing link for a prefix received. Essentially, the 
LOCAL_PREFERENCE attribute is set accordingly to 
the site TE requirements, so that preferred routes are 
selected when they are available in order to reach 
specific destinations. In this scheme, TE is determined 
and enforced by the site’s BGP routers through 
manual configuration, and hosts are not involved. 
• TE mechanisms for incoming traffic: Multihomed sites 
can inject a combination of routes to the interdomain 
routing system that includes several more or less 
specific prefixes referring to their own addresses. Less 
specific prefixes provide fall back routes, in case that 
the more specific routes are not available. More 
specific routes express TE policies, so that traffic for 
these more specific prefixes is routed through the 
desired path.  
In addition, a multihomed site can somehow 
influence part of the path through which packets flow 
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to the site using AS path prepending, so that a remote 
site can perceive one of the paths to the same prefix 
less attractive than the other ones. However, it must 
be noted that this configuration can be overridden by 
the sites that are forwarding the packet.  
Finally, other BGP attributes can be used to express 
preference for incoming traffic. The COMMUNITY 
attribute allows tagging some announces in order to 
inform that some policy previously accorded between 
the sites should be applied. The MED attribute is also 
used to express policies between neighbor sites. 
In any case, the TE capabilities reside in the routers, 
and hosts cannot influence the path used.  
While the presented IPv4 multihomed solution 
provides fairly good features regarding to fault tolerance 
and TE, it presents very limited scalability with respect to 
the interdomain routing system, since each multihomed 
site using this solution contributes with new routes to the 
already oversized routing table. For this reason, more 
scalable multihoming solutions are being explored for 
IPv6. 
3. IPv6 multihoming architecture  
As it has been presented in the introduction, Provider 
Aggregatable addressing is used to guarantee the 
scalability of the multihoming solution. Multihomed sites 
obtain one prefix per each one of their providers. 
Consequently, as each provider only announces its own 
prefix to the rest of the Internet, a given provider is used 
to reach the multihomed site only when the destination 
addresses belong to the prefix associated with the 
provider. So, in order to be reachable through all the 
providers of the site, each host within the multihomed site 
has to configure multiple addresses, one per provider. 
To provide fault tolerance to established 
communications, the SHIM6 architecture defines a 
protocol [3] and a security framework based on addresses 
with cryptographic properties. The SHIM6 architecture 
allows diverting a packet of a communication to an 
address of the host delegated by an alternative ISP. This 
change has to be performed in a transparent fashion with 
respect to transport and application layers, in order to 
preserve the established communication, since current 
transport layers identify the endpoints of a 
communication through the IP addresses of the nodes 
involved. The multihoming mechanism located in the 
SHIM6 layer translates the address used for exchanging 
packets (namely locator) according to the available 
providers, while always presenting a constant address 
(identifier) to the upper layers of the stack. As a result, the 
SHIM6 layer performs a mapping between the identifier 
presented to the upper layers and the locator actually used 
to exchange packets on the wire. Note that a given 
address can be simultaneously a locator and an identifier, 
since it can be used for packet forwarding and also be 
presented to the higher layers. Both ends exchange the 
information about alternative locators using a 
multihoming protocol between the SHIM6 layers. 
3.1. SHIM6 security architecture 
The security architecture proposed for the multihoming 
protocol is based in the use of cryptographic addresses 
such as CGA (Cryptographically Generated Addresses, 
[7]). CGA incorporate into the 64-bit interface identifier 
(II) a cryptographic one-way hash of a public key and 
PCGA, a prefix owned by the node, creating a binding 
between this public key and the resulting address.  
IICGA=hash|64 (Kpublic_key | PCGA)
The CGA is built appending the resulting CGA 
interface identifier to the CGA network prefix: 
PCGA::IICGA.
The private key corresponding to the Kpublic_key used to 
generate the address can sign the alternative locators that 
are conveyed in the SHIM6 protocol exchange described 
later. The trust chain is as follows: the identifier used for 
the communication is securely bound to the key pair, 
because it contains the hash of the public key, and the 
alternative address is bound to the public key through the 
signature. This chain provides hijacking protection, 
requiring at least O(259) operations to impersonate a given 
address if the key pair is strong enough. 
3.2. SHIM6 protocol 
The SHIM6 protocol [3] is used to create and manage 
the SHIM6 context associated with the communication 
between two end-points, and then to be able to exchange 
data packets using different locators while preserving the 
established communication. Additional protocols, as 
defined in [8], are used to detect failures affecting the 
currently used path, and to explore alternative paths and 
select among them the most appropriate one to divert the 
communication to. 
We next describe the context establishment and data 
packet exchange functions of the SHIM6 protocol. 
3.2.1. SHIM6 context establishment. Consider the 
case where one of the parties involved in a 
communication decides to create a SHIM6 context in 
order to benefit from the enhanced fault tolerance 
capabilities of multihoming. We refer to the party that 
decides to initiate the SHIM6 context creation process as 
the initiator, and the other party involved in the 
communication as the receiver. We assume that at least 
one of the parties involved in the communication is 
multihomed. The multihomed host(s) has generated a 
CGA and has signed with the private key a set of its 
Proceedings of the 32nd EUROMICRO Conference on Software Engineering and Advanced Applications (EUROMICRO-SEAA'06)
0-7695-2594-6/06 $20.00  © 2006
locators that belong to some of the multiple prefixes 
available in the multihomed site.  
The initiator requests the creation of a SHIM6 context 
associated with a pair of identifiers, at least one of them 
being the CGA. The initiator issues an I1 message to 
provide some form of Denial-of-Service attack protection 
by allowing the receiver to refuse the creation of any 
context-related state until the initiator has proven its 
location through this preliminary packet exchange. This 
message just informs the receiver about the initiator’s will 
to establish a SHIM6 context. Upon the reception of this 
message, the receiver does not create any state, but it 
simply replies with a R1 message. 
Once that the initiator has received the R1 message, it 
sends an I2 message that contains the pair of identifiers, 
the locator set available at the initiator, and the context 
tag that will be used to identify data packets sent with 
alternative locators, as it is detailed in next section. The I2
message includes the parameters associated to the 
initiator’s CGA, if available, i.e. the public key of the 
initiator and its prefix, and the alternative locators signed 
with the private key. It can also convey a preference 
specification for each one of the locators exchanged in the 
form of a Locator Preferences option. 
Upon the reception of the I2 message, the receiver 
verifies the initiator’s identity. If the initiator is using a 
CGA, the interface identifier of the CGA must be the 
result of the hash of the public key received and the prefix 
carried in the I2 message, and this I2 prefix must also be 
the same as the prefix of the CGA address used to 
exchange the SHIM6 protocol information. If these 
verifications are successful, the receiver creates the 
SHIM6 context using the received information, and it 
replies with a R2 message, in which the receiver includes, 
if it is also multihomed, its own locator set, its own 
context tag, the corresponding validation information for 
its identifier, and optionally the Locator Preferences 
parameter. The initiator verifies then the receiver’s 
identity with the parameters received in the R2 message. 
If the verification is successful, the initiator associates the 
received alternative locators to the SHIM6 context state 
and the SHIM6 context establishment process is finished. 
3.2.2. Exchanging data packets in SHIM6. As it has 
been commented above, the SHIM6 layer performs the 
translation between the identifiers and the locators used 
for exchanging packets. For that purpose, it has to 
properly identify the packets that need to be translated. 
While a locator change is not required, the address 
included in the data packet is used as both identifier and 
locator, as it occurs in normal IP operation. However, if 
the locators are changed for an established 
communication, because of an outage or a TE policy, the 
initial identifiers have to be preserved when interfacing to 
upper layers. Considering that all the addresses available 
in a multihomed host can be used both as locators and as 
identifiers, and that it is possible that the same address is 
being simultaneously used as a locator in one 
communication and as an identifier in another one, the 
addresses contained in the received packets are not 
enough to identify a particular communication. In order to 
overcome this difficulty, additional information needs to 
be carried in the packets themselves. The communication 
to which incoming packets belong is indicated by the 
context tag included in the data packets into a SHIM6 
Payload Extension Header when the locators are different 
from the identifiers. An Update message can be sent at 
any time to inform about new locators or to modify the 
preferences. 
3.2.3. Failure detection and recovery.  The failure 
detection procedure gathers information from several 
sources to determine if an outage has occurred. In 
particular, it considers feedback from upper layer 
protocols, ICMP error messages, and keepalive SHIM6 
specific messages used to probe the reachability of the 
destination through a given pair of locators.  
If a failure is detected, probes are sent using different 
pairs of the available locators as destination and source 
addresses to find new valid paths. The host then selects 
for the next data packets to be sent one of the locator pairs 
that have been acknowledged by the correspondent host. 
It is not required to use a single locator pair for both 
directions of the communication. 
4. Traffic Engineering in multiaddressed sites 
With respect to TE, the multiaddressing configuration 
greatly modifies the situation currently available in IPv4. 
We first present the elements that determine the ingress 
and egress path from a multiaddressed site, and we then 
discuss the solutions for TE enforcement for a basic 
multiaddressed scenario in which a SHIM6 mechanism is 
not available, showing the limitations of this scenario.  
The comparison between path selection capabilities for 
the current IPv4 solution based on BGP and the IPv6 one 
based on multiaddresing is the following 
• Outgoing traffic selection. In the current IPv4 
solution, any of the outgoing paths can forward 
packets that contain a source address with the prefix 
assigned to the multihomed site. In the 
multiaddressing scenario, packets have to flow 
through the ISP associated with the prefix of the 
source address in order to avoid being discarded by 
ingress filtering.  
• Incoming traffic selection. In the currently deployed 
IPv4 multihoming solution, each multihomed host 
usually is assigned a single IP address, and there are 
multiple paths available in the interdomain routing 
system to that particular address. TE is then performed 
Proceedings of the 32nd EUROMICRO Conference on Software Engineering and Advanced Applications (EUROMICRO-SEAA'06)
0-7695-2594-6/06 $20.00  © 2006
by proper configuration (more or less specific routes, 
AS prepending, etc.) of the multiple routes available 
in the routing system for that address. When 
multiaddressing is adopted, the multihomed site is 
reachable through a given route/ISP only through the 
proper prefix, so in order to reach the multihomed site 
through a given ISP, the correspondent prefix/address 
has to be used in the communication. This implies that 
the ingress path used is determined by which locator is 
used among the multiple addresses available for a 
host. 
Therefore, the ISP used by packets to egress or ingress 
for a given site is determined by the local address selected 
as identifier for the communication. This address remains 
unchanged for the lifetime of the communication if 
SHIM6 is not used. For a non-SHIM6 communication, TE 
can only be enforced by influencing in the address 
selection mechanism at the beginning of the 
communication. However, different considerations have 
to be made to externally and to internally initiated 
communications. 
When a host outside the multihomed site attempts to 
initiate a communication with a host within the 
multihomed site, it obtains the set of destination 
addresses, and it selects one according to RFC 3484. It 
seems then that the only place where the multihomed site 
can express TE considerations is through the DNS server 
replies. The DNS server can be configured to modify the 
order of the addresses returned to express some form of 
TE. When the host receives the list of addresses, it 
processes them according to the rules specified in RFC 
3484 to express its local preferences. If none of those 
rules applies, the list is unchanged and the first address 
received from the DNS is tried. 
For internally initiated communications, the exit ISP 
for both incoming and outgoing traffic is determined by 
the source address included in the initiating packet. This 
means that the source address selection mechanism 
defined in RFC 3484 determines the exit ISP. RFC 3484 
defines a DAS Policy Table that can be configured to 
express TE considerations. 
These mechanisms are limited in several ways. The 
most relevant limitation is that sites are no longer capable 
of defining their own TE policies, but these policies are 
fully determined by the hosts. While end-sites could 
deploy tools for uploading TE policies in the form of 
DAS table to the hosts, or as DNS configurations to the 
corresponding DNS server, this is not always feasible due 
to the internal organization, and it is not an option for a 
higher level provider of the multiaddressed end-site 
whose connectivity with the Internet depends also on 
multiaddressing. Therefore, a comprehensive set of 
mechanisms enabling sites to gain control on TE 
enforcement in a multiaddressing scenario are required. 
5. Traffic Engineering with SHIM6 
In this section we present a set of tools for enabling the 
enforcement of TE for SHIM6 data traffic by site routers. 
The main objective pursued is to enable TE enforcement 
at the routing system, avoiding complex configuration in 
the hosts, and so that updates in TE policies could be 
easily applied. 
The main issues to consider for routing-based TE 
enforcement are the following: 
• For outgoing packets, the source address set by the 
internal host determines the possible outgoing 
providers, since ingress filtering in external ISPs 
restricts the source addresses acceptable to the 
prefixes that have been delegated by those ISPs. 
• For incoming packets, the destination address set by 
the remote host determines the incoming path.  
A solution restoring TE enforcement to the site 
administrator must  
• Return to the routers the capacity they have in the 
IPv4 multihoming model for selecting the path that 
egress packets will follow, overcoming the restrictions 
imposed by ingress filtering within an appropriate 
security framework, and  
• Provide the capacity of influencing in the destination 
address that determines the path for incoming packets.  
We will propose tools for both problems in the next 
sections. 
5.1 TE mechanisms for outgoing traffic  
We propose a model in which internal routers are 
configured to select the egress provider taking into 
account the destination address for SHIM6 data flows. 
Prefix rewriting for source address is used to avoid the 
discard of packets due to ingress filtering. The mechanism 
does not depend on any particular host (either the internal 
or the remote) initiating the communication. We first 
consider which packets can be policed in this way, and we 
next describe the solution. 
In a simple multiaddressing scenario without SHIM6 
support, it has to be enforced that the provider used for a 
data packet is the one that delegated the prefix of the 
source address carried in the IPv6 header. Otherwise, the 
packet is discarded. To ensure that packets are forwarded 
to the proper provider, Source Address Dependant (SAD) 
routing at the site can be deployed [1]. When SAD is 
used, the site maintains in each internal router as many 
different additional routing table instances as prefixes has 
been assigned. The prefix of the source address of the 
packet is used to determine the routing table instance, and 
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proper configuration of each table ensures that the 
provider corresponding to the source address is selected. 
When SHIM6 is used, most outgoing data packets do 
not need to follow the path that the source prefix is 
determining. In this case, the internal routing system can 
use TE policies to determine the egress provider, avoiding 
the discarding of packets due to ingress filtering by 
rewriting the source address of the packets at the internal 
egress routers.  
It should be noted that even with SHIM6, some 
outgoing packets must be forwarded through the 
providers specified by the source address selected by the 
host. For example, when a failure occurs through the 
outgoing path in use, the SHIM6 layer could detect it and 
initiate the exploration of the paths available through the 
alternative locators. In this case, SHIM6 Probe Messages 
are issued to check reachability through different locator 
pairs. These Probe Messages should be routed through the 
providers corresponding to the source prefixes selected by 
the host. Moreover, if a valid locator pair has been found 
in the address pair exploration, subsequent data packets 
should be routed through the paths specified by the source 
prefixes set by the host. Additionally, applications could 
also require the enforcement of a given path that has been 
identified in a locator pair exploration as more convenient 
in terms of packet drop rate or delay. For this 
communications, site TE policies should be overridden, as 
it is discussed below. 
To be able to rewrite the source address for outgoing 
data packets, the SHIM6 Payload Extension Header, 
which contains the context tag used for SHIM6 flow 
identification, is required to be included in all data 
packets belonging to a communication for which a 
SHIM6 context has been established, instead of only 
requiring it for the packets for which a locator has 
changed. A Source Rewriting Enabled bit is included in 
the SHIM6 Payload Extension Header to express that 
source address rewriting can be performed, because the 
communication has not suffered from failures and the host 
does not require any specific path for this communication. 
This bit cannot be modified in transit.  
The packets that carry a SHIM6 Payload Extension 
Header with a Source Rewriting Enabled bit set are 
forwarded using a new routing table instance, additional 
to the ones defined for SAD routing. In this internal 
routing instance, internal egress routers inject routes to 
propagate reachability to some external prefixes. By 
proper configuration of the preference of these announces, 
an administrator can control the amount of traffic that is 
directed to a given exit link, therefore defining the TE 
policy of the site for egress packets. This model has been 
successfully applied for enforcing TE in IPv4 sites with 
BGP capabilities.  
To ensure that source address rewriting can be 
performed properly, the following conditions must also be 
honored by the hosts: 
• The hosts must have been assigned one CGA per 
provider prefix. Per each of this CGA a related set of 
addresses is constructed with each one of the rest of 
the prefixes assigned to the host and the Interface 
Identifier of the CGA considered. Then the hosts have 
the following addresses, being IICGA_i the Interface 
Identifier generated for prefix Pi:
P1::IICGA_1, P2::IICGA_1, …, PN::IICGA_1
…
Pi::IICGA_i, P1::IICGA_i, …, PN::IICGA_i
... 
Therefore, if N prefixes are available at a given host, 
N2 addresses are configured. 
• Communications are initiated using only the CGA 
addresses (P1::IICGA_1,…, Pi::IICGA_i,…). These 
addresses should be the only ones available in the 
DNS for allowing externally initiated 
communications, and should be preferred in the source 
address selection process defined in RFC 3484 for 
internally initiated communications. 
• When an internal host establishes a SHIM6 context for 
a given CGA, it exchanges the set of locators that 
share the Interface Identifier with the CGA.  
Address assignment rules are also required  to 
guarantee that prefix rewriting can be performed properly. 
Consider a multiaddressed site for which several prefixes 
from its providers have been delegated, with different 
lengths for the significant bits (suppose ISP_J delegated a 
/40 to the site, while an ISP_K delegated a /42 – see 
figure 2). For ease prefix rewriting, the site must use the 
same number of bits for its own address assignment, 
regardless of the particular prefix used. The number of 
bits to use is then determined by the most specific prefix 
delegated (in the previous example, only a /42 would be 
used from the ISP_J delegation, and prefix rewriting 
would always be performed for the 42 most significant 
bits of each address). The site and its clients must also 
assign the same network bits for all the prefixes assigned 
for each segment, as it is shown in the internal segment of 
figure 2, so rewriting of the /42 bits of the prefix 
generates a valid prefix that corresponds to the same 
network segment.  
Proceedings of the 32nd EUROMICRO Conference on Software Engineering and Advanced Applications (EUROMICRO-SEAA'06)


















Figure 2. Address delegation for prefix rewriting 
If all the conditions stated held, it can be assured that 
the remote host is aware of all the alternative prefixes that 
can be used for this communication. Then, the router can 
change the source prefix to the one corresponding to the 
provider through which the packet should to flow. This 
operation is performed without per-communication state 
in the router.  
Note that the SHIM6 security checks assure that the 
rewriting process can only be performed among the valid 
prefixes protected by the signature of the internal host, 
because otherwise the remote host will discard the packet. 
It can be highlighted that the prefix rewriting operation 
does not affect to end-to-end identities, thanks to the 
SHIM6 layer, so address rewriting does not require 
specific application level packet manipulation at the 
routers, as it occurs in NATs. 
In this section we have presented a prefix rewriting 
mechanism for SHIM6-enabled hosts using CGA as 
identifiers. Another cryptographic address type has been 
proposed for SHIM6 usage, namely Host Based 
Addresses (HBA, [9]), that allows cheaper identity 
verification than CGA in terms of computing power [10]. 
The main obstacle for applying the rewriting process 
proposed above to HBA is that the locators associated to 
HBA are currently defined to generate a different 
Interface Identifier per prefix to provide some level of 
privacy. Per communication state should be required for 
prefix rewriting with the current HBA specification, 
which is highly undesirable. However, a new HBA type 
could be defined in which the artificial reordering of the 
prefixes specified to generate different Interface 
Identifiers per prefix were not performed.  
5.2 TE mechanisms for incoming traffic
As it has been said before, in a non-SHIM6 
multiaddressed configuration the incoming path is 
determined by the prefix of the local site address used for 
the first packet. This can be influenced by proper 
configuration of the DNS for externally initiated 
communications, and by proper configuration of the 
Policy Table used in the Source Address Selection 
procedure for internally initiated communications.  
In a SHIM6 communication the path followed by 
incoming packets is determined by the correspondent 
host. After a SHIM6 context has been established, the 
correspondent host can decide at any moment to select a 
different locator for the packets it sends to the internal 
host, either because of a failure or due to any preference. 
Remember that the locator pair used in SHIM6 is not 
required to be the same for both directions of the 
communication, so the change in the locator of the 
internal host for incoming traffic does not have to be 
agreed with the host at the local site in any way. 
Fortunately, SHIM6 provides a mechanism to influence in 
the choices of the correspondent host, through the 
optional exchange of a Locator Preferences parameter. 
This parameter, carried in an I2 or R2 messages, can be 
used to express preference for each locator exchanged 
through a 16-bit number. The remote host will perform 
the change suggested by the preference, since in general it 
is not going to interfere with the enforcement of TE in its 
surroundings, which is determined by the remote locator 
used for the communication.  
The administrator of a site can influence on the 
selection of the locators at the remote site by intercepting 
I2 and R2 data packets at the site egress routers, and by 
adding or modifying the Locator Preferences parameter to 
express the preferred policies for the site. Update
messages including the Locator Preferences parameter 
can also be sent at any time for a communication for 
which a SHIM6 context has been established to enable 
dynamic changes in the policies. These operations are 
stateless, and the criteria for determining the preferences 
to establish can be based again in the prefix matching for 
the remote addresses. Note that the Locator Preferences 
parameter is not signed by the end-sites, so its rewriting 
does not break the context establishment procedure. The 
rewriting of the preference can be performed by several 
providers to express the TE policies of each of the higher 
level providers.  
6. Applying site-based TE enforcement to a 
site receiving BGP announcements 
We present a specific configuration that can provide 
additional benefits to a SHIM6-based multiaddressing 
deployment. In this case, the site receives BGP route 
announcements from its providers, although it is not 
allowed to inject its own prefixes because it has not been 
assigned a Provider Independent address range. The 
information received through the BGP route 
announcements provide detailed information to the site 
for providing better fault tolerance and TE support. Prefix 
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rewriting is used to assure ingress filtering compatibility, 
and the transmission of preference information can be 
used for influencing in the path for the incoming traffic. 
When an outage occurs in the Internet, and some 
prefixes are withdrawn, BGP information allows the 
routers in the site to determine the egress routers that are 
still valid for reaching the destination prefix. The internal 
routing then diverts the traffic to the new egress router 
selected for the communication. In this case, an Update
message can be sent to the remote host to inform about 
the new preferred path for receiving traffic. This process 
can be performed transparently to the hosts, without 
triggering the costly SHIM6 recovery procedure.  
Note that some network failures could not be fixed 
only with BGP information. Consider for example a 
failure in the link between a remote multiaddressed site 
with its provider. Although the provider is announcing 
through BGP the prefix aggregate that includes the 
address of the remote site, the site is not reachable 
through this address. SHIM6 can recover this failure by 
selecting an alternative operational locator pair. However, 
BGP would recover from a wide range of failures, 
although the SHIM6 failure detection mechanism and 
recovery procedures should not be disabled in general. As 
a consequence, a reduced rate for the sending of SHIM6 
probe packets when BGP information is available could 
diminish the control traffic generated by SHIM6 while 
resulting in a robust enough solution. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have described a comprehensive set of 
mechanisms for restoring the capacity of the site 
administrator to enforce TE policies in a multiaddressed 
IPv6 scenario. SHIM6 data traffic is directed to a given 
egress router based on the destination address of the 
traffic. The egress router rewrites the prefix of the source 
address to prevent from discarding the packet due to 
ingress filtering at its provider. Some messages belonging 
to the SHIM6 context establishment process are modified 
by the routers to transmit to the remote end-host the 
preferences of the site for incoming traffic. These 
operations are applied to SHIM6 communications without 
requiring explicit collaboration of the internal end-host. 
Some conditions are required for the SHIM6 host, such as 
the inclusion of the SHIM6 Payload Extension Header in 
all data packets, and also for the site’s addressing 
assignment. Stateless operation leads to a low impact in 
router processing. 
The applicability of these mechanisms is expected to 
be broad. First, the scalability concern for the IPv6 
routing system is leading to an scenario in which small 
and even medium sites will be multiaddressed. The end-
hosts located in these multiaddressed networks will 
require a mechanism such as SHIM6 to be able to benefit 
from the multihomed nature of their site or their 
providers. While not all the communications will incur in 
the cost (in terms of local state, computational 
requirements and messages exchanged) of establishing a 
SHIM6 context, long-lasting and data intensive 
communications will do, mainly to obtain fault tolerance. 
This kind of applications are expected to generate a 
relevant part of the traffic generated by the site, specially 
if we consider the high rates required for the transference 
of multimedia contents or real-time communications. 
Additionally, a pricing policy rewarding with lower costs 
the usage by the hosts of SHIM6 rewritable packets could 
increase even more the amount of traffic that could be 
conveniently engineered by the site. 
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